Introduction
With each passing year, digital forensics investigations become more difficult as the capacity and diversity of devices containing digital evidence increases. Many approaches have been proposed for addressing the data onslaught, including parallelization and multi-processing [7, 41] , statistical sampling [? 36] , and even legislative solutions such as extending the amount of time a suspect can be without being charged so that evidence may be analyzed [43] . But no matter what approach is used to improve performance, so long as a backlog exists, some process must be allocate limited forensic resources.
Triage is a term widely used to denote the prioritization of work according to a quality inherent in the objects being acted upon. Today many organizations prioritize their work load solely with reference to the nature of the case, without taking into account the contents of the media itself. For example, the FBI's regional computer forensics laboratories prioritize resources based on the nature of a case: data collected in terrorism cases are given the highest priority so that the lab may "prevent, neutralize, dismantle, and protect against terrorist acts against Americans and assets." [32] Many local police departments use trial dates and the statute of limitations to prioritize their workload-implying that media is typically analyzed months or even years after it has been seized.
We propose expanding triage to include the results of a rapid and largely automated analysis of the media, performed when the media is first encountered. With the results of the triage it is possible to determine if the media is likely to have in-formation of intelligence value and, therefore, should be prioritized for immediate analysis.
This article describes a number of advances we have made in bulk data analysis, an approach for performing digital forensics analysis that eschews file extraction, and instead focuses on the processing of bulk data and the extraction of salient details ("features.") Unlike file-based approaches, we have found that bulk data analysis is particularly well-suited to triage, as it allows for the rapid identification and extraction of features such as email addresses and credit card numbers. Experience has shown that the presence of such information is of significant value.
In this article we also present bulk extractor, an open source tool that we have developed over the past two years, which embodies many of the discoveries that we have made in bulk data processing.
We have found that bulk data analysis is particularly useful in cases that involve multiple pieces of digital evidence. For example, in a case involving credit card theft, bulk data analysis can identify which laptop or telephone has the largest collection of credit card numbers, allowing investigators to chose which disk to analyze first. In an organized crime or public corruption case, bulk data analysis can identify which hard drives or cell phones contain email addresses of interest: Bulk data analysis can even generate new leads, without the need for in-depth media analysis. Bulk data analysis further has the advantage of being fast: our experience has shown that our software typically processes digital media ten times faster than today's industry standard tools on hardware that is typical in most local or regional law enforcement agencies. Thus, systematic bulk data analysis has the potential for radically transforming the role of digital media analysis in law enforcement today, changing it from a conviction-support tool (through the identification of illegal materials) to assisting in investigations (through the identification of new leads and social networks).
Contributions
This paper makes several specific contributions to the theory and practice of digital forensics. First, this paper shows that bulk data analysis without reference to an underlying file system can be productively used as a fast analysis step during the early part of an investigation. We also show that bulk data analysis is easily adopted to stream processing and multithreading: our quantitative analysis shows linear speedup as additional cores are added to the analysis process.
We present bulk extractor, a powerful tool for performing bulk data analysis. By sharing our experience in developing bulk extractor, we present a model for the development of other digital forensic tools.
We introduce the concept of a context-sensitive stop list, and explain how stop lists that do not include local context are susceptible to manipulation by criminals and other adversaries.
We present a new forensic disk image designed for testing the string recovery feature of modern computer forensic tools. We perform an evaluation using this test disk that compares our tool with Guidance Software's EnCase and the traditional approach of running the Unix strings and grep commands. In so doing, we show that our implementation can recover more kinds of high-value forensic features than current tools, and that it runs dramatically faster than current tools in both single-core and multi-core environments.
Finally, we provide two real-world case studies that show how features provided by bulk data analysis have been used productively early in a forensic investigation.
File-Based Forensics
Two approaches now dominate the processing of digital evidence: file-based and bulk data forensics.
File-based forensics is widely used by computer forensic examiners and implemented by popular tools such as Guidance Software's EnCase [25] and AccessData's FTK [4] . Such tools operate by finding, extracting, identifying and processing files-that is, a sequential collection of bytes and metadata (e.g. file name and timestamps).
Because it mirrors the way that users interact with computers, file-based forensics has the advantage of being easy to understand. The file-based approach also integrates well with most legal systems, because extracted files can be printed and entered into evidence. It has the disadvantage of ignoring data not contained within files, as well as ignoring the unallocated regions and metadata within compound document files not made visible by forensic tools. Additional limitations can be found in [18] .
Bulk Data Analysis
In bulk data analysis, digital content is examined without regard to partitions or file system metadata. Instead, data of potential interest is identified by content and processed, extracted, and reported as necessary. File carving ( §2.3) is an example of bulk data analysis.
An important aspect of bulk data analysis is that it can be applied to all types of computer systems, file systems, and file types-especially those not handled by existing tools. Bulk data analysis can also be readily applied to media that has been damaged or partially overwritten.
As the forensic analysis of different parts of the bulk data can be conducted independently of each other, bulk data analysis is easier to parallelize than traditional forensic approaches that require reconstruction of the media's file system.
bulk extractor: An Overview
bulk extractor is a command-line program that extracts email addresses, credit card numbers, URLs, and other types of information from digital evidence files. bulk extractor operates on disk images in raw, split-raw, EnCase E01 [30] , and AFF [23] formats. The disk image is split into pages and processed by one or more scanners. Identified features are stored in feature files, a simple line-based format that can be viewed directly with a text editor or processed by subsequent tools. The program produces report files containing extracted features, their location and frequency. The names of the files containing each feature can be determined through post-processing.
bulk extractor detects and opportunistically decompress data in ZIP, gzip, and Microsoft's XPress Block Memory Compression algorithm [47] . This has proven useful, for example, in recovering email addresses from within fragments of corrupted system hibernation files.
bulk extractor gets its speed through the use of compiled search expressions and multi-threading. The search expressions are written as pre-compiled regular expressions, essentially allowing bulk extractor to perform searches on disparate terms in parallel ( §3.2). Threading is accomplished through use of an analysis thread pool ( §4.4).
After the features have been extracted, bulk extractor builds a histogram of email addresses, Google search terms, and other extracted features. Stop lists can remove features not relevant to a case.
Outline of This Article
This concludes the introduction. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 discusses the design of our bulk analysis system and presents the design choices that were made. Section 4 discusses the actual implementation in bulk extractor. Section 5 presents the results of bulk extractor run against both test data and hundreds of forensic images. Section 6 presents two case studies. Section 7 discusses limitations of our architecture and opportunities for future work. Section 8 concludes.
Related Work

Recursive Re-Analysis and the Recovery of Compressed Information
The approach of recursively re-analyzing data encountered in forensic analysis is widely used by anti-virus programs, existing media forensics tools (e.g. [25, 4] , and network forensics tools [13] . However, these tools generally apply re-analysis solely to intact files identified as being compressed or container files.
PyFlag [11] applies recursive reanalysis to data in runs of unallocated sectors, but only attempts to decompress at the beginning of each run. (The forensic path used by bulk extractor to report the location of extracted features ( §3.4) is similar to the virtual path reported by PyFlag.) The NetIntercept [13] network forensic tool automatically decompresses compressed network streams, but only for protocols known to use compression.
Our experience with bulk data analysis indicates that it is important to detect and decompress compressed data before performing feature extraction. We have identified five potential sources of compressed data on a hard drive:
1. Many web browsers download data from web servers with gzip compression and persist the compressed stream directly in the web cache. (The percentage of web servers employing compression increased from less than 5% to 30% between 2003 and 2010 [39] because compression significantly increases the web performance [38, 46] .) 2. The .docx and .pptx file formats used by Microsoft Office store content as compressed XML files in ZIP archives [19] . 3. NTFS file compression may result in disk sectors that contain compressed data. The most commonly compressed files are Windows restore points, as the operating system compresses these automatically. However, users may choose to have any file compressed. 4. The Windows hibernation file is lightly compressed using a lightweight proprietary compression system [47] . 5. Files are increasingly bundled together and distributed as ZIP, RAR, or .tar.gz archives for convenience and to decrease bandwidth requirements. Today's forensic applications generally process compressed data when it is present in files, but do not proactively detect and decompress compressed data present in unallocated sectors, a process we call opportunistic decompression. We are aware of no other research or commercial tool that performs compression detection and opportunistic decompression for every byte of the subject media.
Although it is widely known that Windows hibernation files contain potentially valuable information, the beginning of each file is overwritten when Windows resumes from hibernation. We know of no other generally available tool that can use these corrupted hibernation files. For example, Zhao and Cao reported that they were unable to analyze the contents of hibernation files due to the use "an undocumented, Microsoft proprietary file format, including proprietary compression." [52] 
Single-Block Forensics
In prior research we introduced a simplified form of bulk data processing that performed analysis of single sectors [? ] . The approach presented here is more comprehensive, as it will identify features that cross sectors or span multiple sectors. Further, this work also includes recursive re-analysis of bulk data, while our prior work did not.
Carving
Carving in digital forensics refers to the practice of extracting information based on content, rather than by relying on metadata that points to the content. File carving is a special kind of carving in which files are recovered. Although the two terms are frequently used interchangeably, carving describes a more general technique. For example, it is possible to carve a single still image out of a (possibly corrupt) video file [45] .
File carving is useful for both data recovery and forensic investigations because it can recover files when sectors containing file system metadata are either overwritten or damaged. The earliest file carvers (e.g. [35, 42] ) employed simple header/footer carving. Second-generation carvers (e.g. [17, 21] ) perform this verification automatically, significantly reducing the amount of data produced. Some carvers (e.g. [17, 24] ) can perform limited reconstruction of fragmented files.
Forensic Feature Extraction
Computer media frequently contains a persistent record of a subject's associates, activities, and financial activities. As such, software that automatically searches for these types of artifacts can aid many investigations. Previously we adopted the term forensic feature extraction to describe this process [20] .
Today many forensic tools allow searching files and unallocated sectors for strings that match user-specified regular expressions. Vendors and trainers publish lists of regular expressions that match email addresses, US telephone numbers, US social security numbers, credit card numbers, IP addresses, and other kinds of information typically useful in an investigation (e.g. [5] , [9, p. 304-305] ). Credit card number searches are also performed by the Cornell University Spider forensic tool [14] . The University of Michigan Office of Information Technology Security Services reviewed several tools for discovering credit card and social security numbers in 2008 [49] .
The work presented here improves prior work in forensic feature extraction by using hand-tuned rules that consider local context to improve the precision of extraction without adversely impacting recall.
Parallel Processing
More than four decades of research have developed numerous approaches for speeding text processing through the use of parallelism. Indeed, Bird et al. discussed parallelized searching of a 50GB database in the 1970s using specialized machines [8] . Similar efforts continue to this day [31] .
Although there have been some attempts in the research community to parallelize forensic tools, little of this work is being used in the field. For example, Marziale et al. adapted the Scalpel file carver to offload complex computations to a GPU, but that version of Scalpel was never released. Collange et al. considered the use of GPUs for speeding hashing to enable hash-based data carving [12] , but no commercial forensic tool uses GPUs for hashing due to I/O limitations. Urias et al. considered a variety of issues involving the parallelized processing of RAID storage systems[2], but despite increasing media sizes, tools such as EnCase and FTK still are largely single-threaded.
The parallelization in this paper is distinguished from prior efforts in that we present a system for parallel processing that is easily implemented and automatically takes advantage of general-purpose multi-core CPUs, the most common form of parallelized hardware available. As such, this is parallelism that can be readily used by current practitioners.
Tool Validation
The US Supreme Court held in Daubert that scientific evidence presented in court must involve established techniques that are peer-reviewed and have error rates that can be measured [50] . But little is known about the accuracy of feature extraction and string search of today's forensic tools. The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Computer Forensics Tool Testing Program created draft specifications have been written for String Search [40] and Deleted File Recovery [1] , but the drafts have not advanced past an initial version and no test results have been published. Important real-world requirements are missing from these drafts, such as the ability to recover information from complex document formats and compressed data.
In the absence of a standard, Guo et al. advocate testing tools with simplified data sets containing known targets [26] -for example, by validating string search creating documents containing the word "evidence" and then searching for it. We present an improvement to this procedure that involves embedding different targets in different file formats. This improvement makes it more complicated to prepare the test media, but also makes it significantly easier to determine the source of each extracted feature, since each feature is distinct.
Design of bulk extractor
Requirements Study
Between 2003 and 2005 we developed a prototype bulk media analysis tool to assist in an unrelated investigation. We soon discovered that our tool was taking a fundamentally different approach than existing tools. Not only did the tool run dramatically faster than file-based systems, but it became easy to answer questions of specific interest, such as Does this drive contain sensitive information? and Who was the primary user of this drive?
Because our tool did not easily map to existing categories, we conducted a series of unstructured interviews with local, state and federal law enforcement officers to determine if there was a need for this new kind of tool. In total, approximately 20 interviews took place between 2005 and 2008.
Analysts were generally enthusiastic about the research. They made specific requests that the tool extract specific types of information, including:
• Email addresses • Credit card numbers, including track 2 information • Search terms (extracted from URLs)
• Phone numbers
• A list of all words present on the disk, for use in password cracking These interviews also provided us with a number of operational requirements for the intended tool:
• Able to run on Windows, Linux and Macintosh-based systems • Operate on raw disk images, split-raw volumes, EnCase E01 files, and AFF files • Perform batch analysis with no user input • Allow users to provide additional regular expressions for searches • Automatically extract features from compressed data such as ZIP and windows hibernation files • Run as fast as the physical drive or storage system can deliver data • Identify the specific files in the file system that were the source of the extracted features • Produce output as an easy-to-use text file • Never crash We also learned from our interviews that the primary use of the tool would be for triage-that is, to prioritize which pieces of digital evidence should be analyzed first-to identify specific email addresses for follow-up investigation. Final analysis, however, would typically be performed with an "approved" tool.
The requirements analysis process was both informative and beneficial to our research and tool development.
Forensic Scanners and Feature Extractors
Our basic design uses multiple scanners that run sequentially on raw digital evidence. These scanners are provided with a buffer to analyze (initially corre-sponding to a 16MiB page of data read from the disk image) the location or path of the buffer's first byte, and a mechanism for recording extracted features. All scanners process all buffers until there are no more buffers to analyze. At this point the program performs post-processing and finally exits.
There are two types of scanners. Basic scanners, also known as feature extractors, are limited to analyzing the buffer and recording what they find. An example is the email scanner (scan email), which can find email addresses, RFC822 headers, and other recognizable strings likely to be in email messages. Extracted features are recorded in a feature file (Figure 1 ).
Recursive scanners, as their name implies, can decode data and pass it back to the buffer processor for re-analysis. An example is scan zip, which detects the components of ZIP files, records the ZIP header as an XML feature, decompresses the data, and passes the decompressed data back to the buffer processor.
Forensic programs that process compressed data must guard against decompression bombs-files that, when fully decompressed, extend to many terabytes, petabytes, or even more [6] . We implement two defenses against compression bombs. First, only a configurable portion of each compressed stream is decompressed. Second, the page processor will not call the recursive scanners when the depth reaches a configurable limit (by default, five recursions).
Feature Files
In our interviews, analysts repeatedly requested that our tool provide output as a simple text file that could be viewed with an editor or processed with other "scripting" tools. To accommodate this request we designed the feature file format, a simple tab-delimited text file containing the offset at which the feature was found, the feature itself, and a configurable number of bytes that precede and follow the feature in the evidence file ( Figure 1 ). Feature files are not sorted but are loosely ordered.
Although this format has proved useful, in some cases it is necessary to report multiple values associated with each extracted feature. In these cases we replace the third field with an XML fragment. For example, our design uses a block of XML to report all of the fields associated with EXIF structures found within embedded JPEGs. XML is useful because different EXIF structures contain different fields. A post-processing program transforms this XML-based feature file into a single CSV file that can be readily imported into Microsoft Excel.
Another post-processing tool can add a fourth column: the file from which the feature is extracted (see §3.4).
Forensic Location, Path, and File System Correlation
For reporting purposes it is important to identify the location at which each piece of extracted information is found. This can be challenging when using tools that have the ability to extract information from within compressed objects.
Consider a message containing a set of credit card numbers viewed using a webmail service. If the web client and server both support HTTP compression, the web page will most likely be downloaded as a GZIP-compressed stream; both Firefox and Internet Explorer will then store the compressed stream in the browser cache. In this case it is not enough to simply report where the credit card numbers are found on the subject's disk, because looking at the disk sectors with a hex editor will not reveal them: it is also necessary to explain how the data must be transformed to make them intelligible.
We resolve this problem by reporting a forensic path for each feature found. For features recovered from uncompressed data, the forensic path is simply the distance in bytes from the beginning of the media. In cases where the feature is contained within an object that is decompressed or otherwise processed by a recursive scanner, the forensic path contains information that can be used to repeat the decoding process.
For example, the fourth line of Figure 1 indicates that jbarnes@virtuousgeek.org is found by decompressing the GZIP stream found at 318707924 within the disk image; the email address occurs 70 characters from the start of the decompressed stream. (The email address is contained within the file /casper/filesystem.squashfs.)
Forensic paths can be extended: the email address nelson@crynwr.com in Figure 1 is found by decompressing the GZIP stream that begins at byte offset 946315592; 6400 bytes into the decompressed stream is a second compressed stream; the email address is found 1600 bytes into that stream. (This email address appears within the file gnash-common 0.8.4-0ubuntu1 i386.deb in the directory /var/cache/apt/archives/.) We have found a high number of such double-compressed artifacts in the unallocated regions of subject media.
Forensic paths can be readily translated to a specific location in a resident or deleted file with a file system map. Our program fiwalk[? ] produces such a map in just a few minutes for most disk drives smaller than a terabyte; the operation is fast because only file system metadata needs to be examined. The program file locations.py, included with bulk extractor, can then be used to annotate a feature file with the file names from the subject media corresponding to the sectors from which the features were extracted.
Histogram Processing
In previous work we showed that frequency distribution histograms to be of significant use in forensic investigations [20] . For example, a frequency histogram of email addresses found on a hard drive readily identifies the drive's primary user and that person's primary contacts.
Histogram generation is integrated with the feature recording system so that histograms can be created for any feature. Our design further allows histograms to be generated from substrings extracted from features using regular expressions. For example, this regular expression creates a histogram of search terms provided to Google, Yahoo, and other popular search engines:
Histograms of search terms are particularly useful when conducting an investigation, as they reveal the intent of the computer's user, as we discuss in Section 6.1. 1
Context-Sensitive Stop Lists
Many of the email addresses, phone numbers and other identifiers on a hard drive are distributed as part of the operating system or application programs. For example, in our previous work we identified the email address mazrob@panix.com as being part of the Windows 95 Utopia Sound Scheme [20] . We suggested that one way to suppress these common features was to weight each feature by the inverse frequency with which the feature appears in the corpus, apparently an application of the well-known TF-IDF approach used in information retrieval [28] .
For reasons that we did not anticipate in 2005, but which became clear during our interviews, it is not possible for many organizations to create a single list of all the email addresses extracted from every processed disk. Instead, many organizations manually produce lists of email addresses and domain names based on examiner experience that are ignored, technically known as stop lists.
Stop lists can be readily produced from default installs of popular operating systems. We have done this and found a staggering number of email addresses and URLs in some OSes. For example, Fedora Core 12 contains nearly 14 thousand distinct email addresses (see Table 2 ). Additional email addresses and URLs are also present in application programs.
Clearly, a forensic analyst who does not employ stop lists will be overwhelmed by such information. However, there is also a significant danger in naïvely employing stop lists: They can provide criminals with the ability to escape detection by using an email address associated with an operating system. Given that it is relatively easy to get an arbitrary email address embedded in open source programs, this is a significant and previously unrecognized risk when using stop lists.
Our solution is the introduction of context-sensitive stop lists. The key insight is that email addresses such as mazrob@panix.com should only be ignored when they are encountered in the context of operating system files-elsewhere they should be reported. So instead of creating a stop list containing just the email addresses found in default operating system installs, we create a stop list that contains the local context-that is, the characters that appear before and after the feature to be suppressed. Table 1 shows the results of histogram processing on the nps-2009-domexusers disk image before and after the application of the context-sensitive stop list produced from several default Windows XP, 2000 and 2003 installations. The stop list removes email addresses clearly associated with certificate authorities (e.g. ips@mail.ips.edu and premium-server@thawte.com), but leaves those email addresses associated with the scenario.
Finally, through use in actual cases have learned that items on a stop list should not be suppressed from the examiner. Instead, we report these items to separate files. This allows the examiner to manually review the stopped items to verify that no case-specific information was inadvertently excluded. It also allows validation of the stop list processing.
Implementation
We have created bulk extractor, a command-line program that implements our design and has been deployed to a number of production environments around the world. Version 1.0.0 of bulk extractor consists of 8436 lines of C++ code and 1011 lines of GNU flex code.
Functional Modules
Our current implementation consists of five modules:
1. An initialization module verifies command line parameters, and creates the analysis thread pool. 2. The image processing module reads the disk image, extracts a series of 16MiB pages, and passes each page off to a thread in the thread pool. 3. The analysis thread pool operates multiple threads, each of which receives an incoming page and processes it with one or more feature scanners. 4. The feature scanners process each buffer and identify features that can be recovered.
5. The feature recording module records features identified by the scanners in one or more feature files. This modular design makes it straightforward to add additional processing capabilities.
Scanner Implementation
We use purpose-built scanners based on regular expressions and hand-tuned rules to extract forensic information, an approach validated in the 1990s by natural language researchers [37] . The email scanner and the accounts scanner are both implemented as a series of regular expressions compiled using GNU flex [48] (Figure 2 ). This technique creates object code that can be quite large (the email scanner is 4 MiBytes) but runs quickly. Another scanner implements the AES key-finding algorithm developed by Halderman et al. [27] . The AES scanner is quite slow and is therefore disabled by default.
Some of our early scanners produced unacceptably high levels of false positives when processing PDFs, TIFFs, and other file types containing long runs of formatted numbers. The false positives were decreased with additional hand-tuned filters that examine the local context in which the features are found. For example, while EnCase 6.2.1 identifies the string Box [-568 -307 2000 1006] /FontName as containing the US phone number 307 2000, our system does not, as we recognize that the numbers 307 2000 are part of a larger group that does not conform to the US phone number pattern.
bulk extractor uses a straightforward API with a single callable function to initialize each scanner, process bulk data, and perform post-processing. Scanners can be linked into the bulk extractor executable or loaded at run time. This makes it easy for organizations to extend bulk extractor using proprietary technology while still maintaining an open source base that is usable to the general comunity.
The current scanners distributed with the open source bulk extractor are shown in Table 3 .
The Margin
It is straightforward to process a disk image block-by-block or page-by-page. Occasionally important features cross block or page boundaries. Many programs that process bulk data simply discard features that cross these block boundaries. In our interviews we learned that analysts are generally unaware that their tools systematically discard such features: upon learning of the behavior, they pronounced it unacceptable.
Our approach is to append to each buffer a margin of additional bytes from the following region of the evidence file. The implementation thus maintains two lengths for each buffer: the buffer size and the margin size. The margin is large enough so that any feature or compressed region that begins near the end of the current page will fit within the margin. Only features that extend into the margin are reported; those that begin in the margin are suppressed and reported later, when the contents of the margin are re-processed.
We have experimentally determined that a margin of 1MiB is sufficient for most situations.
Parallelizing bulk extractor
Many authors have noted that it is vital for forensic tools to adopt parallelism both in order to keep up with increasing forensic collections and to make the most efficient use of modern hardware (e.g. [41, 7] ). But vendors have been slow to parallelize their tools because of the complexity of managing multiple analyzers and combining the results in a thread-safe manner. Our approach of treating the disk image as a series of independent pages turns feature extraction into an "embarrassingly parallel" problem, as each page can be processed independently once features that cross page boundaries are properly handled ( §4.3).
We devised three strategies for processing the pages in parallel: 1. Regions: The disk is divided into N equal regions, one for each thread. 2. Striping: Page 0 is processed by thread 0, page 1 by thread 1, and so on, up to page N, which is again processed by thread 0. 3. Thread Pool: One thread reads all of the pages in order and processed by a pool of worker threads. We implemented all three strategies and found that the thread pool consistently outperformed the others with our test data downloaded from the http: //digitalcorpora.org website.
We performed a series of tests to determine the success of our multi-threading approach and the relative performance of multiple threads under Windows and Linux. We used the 2.1GB nps-2009-ubnist1 disk image [22] . The test machine was a MacBook Pro 8GiB of RAM and four physical cores (8 with hyperthreading) and an SSD, rebooting computer between each trial to assure that the disk was not cached the system's RAM. We tested under both the 64-bit MacOS 10.6 and Windows 7 operating systems.
With a single thread, MacOS required on average 3998 seconds to analyze the disk image, for an average performance of 0.53 MBytes/sec. With four analyzing threads the performance increased to 2.5 MB/sec-roughly a linear speedup, as evidenced by the first part of the graph. Cores 5 through 8 are hyperthreaded, meaning that the processor runs instructions on these virtual "cores" when the various functional units are not otherwise in use. Not surprisingly, we no longer see a strict linear speedup, although the region of the graph as the number of cores are increased from 5 to 8 is itself linear. With eight analyzing threads performance increased to 3.0 MB/sec. Thus, the additional four hyperthreaded "cores" provide roughly the power as a single physical core. This is uncharacteristically poor performance for hyperthreading, and it argues that the bulk extractor threads are making excellent use of the CPU's functional units, leaving few resources available for the virtualized cores.
As can also be seen from the graph, adding additional analyzing threads resulted in lower performance, presumably due to increased issues. For this reason, bulk extractor automatically determines the correct number of analyzing threads to use when it runs, freeing the examiner from this task.
Although we also saw linear speedup under Windows, the peak performance was roughly two-thirds that of the same hardware under MacOS. We cannot explain the poor performance of the Windows operating system, but note such observations are commonplace.
For a realistic comparison with EnCase, we used the 40GB nps-2009-domexusers disk image as our test data and a typical examiner's machine, a dual-processor Xenon X5650 at 2.67Ghz (12 physical cores, 12 hyperthreaded cores), with 12GB RAM running Windows 7 Professional. Our test was simple: extract and report all of the email addresses in the disk image. The results (Figure 4 ) indicate that our multi-threaded bulk extractor extracted email addresses from the forensic test disk image 10x faster than EnCase 6.2.1 running on the same hardware, and was only 5% slower than simply running ewfexport, strings and grep ( Figure 4 ). As we show in §5.1, bulk extractor also finds significantly more email addresses than either EnCase or strings.
Validation
This section discusses how bulk extractor has been tested with constructed test data, with clean operating system installs, and with real data.
Constructed Test Drives
Although the recovery of email addresses from disk drives is a common forensic task, we could find no test procedures or data sets to help us compare bulk extractor's effectiveness with other tools. For example, the one NIST test disk for performing string search ( [34] ) only tests the ability to search for Cyrillic names, not email addresses. Meanwhile, the data sets created by Guo et al. for testing string search functions [26] have not been publicly released.
Faced with this lack of test images, we constructed our own. We created a series of test documents using various office productivity applications. Each document contained a single descriptive email address. In some cases we used the applications to produce PDF files. All of the documents were stored in a disk image. The choice of document formats was based on our experience with real-world investigations. These documents were then stored in a FAT32 disk image and subjected to analysis by bulk extractor and EnCase 6.2.1. We also analyzed the disk image with strings and grep as a control. Table 4 summarizes the results.
For every target bulk extractor finds more email addresses than either EnCase or the Unix tools, primarily because of its ability to detect and recursively reanalyze compressed data. The only email addresses that bulk extractor fails to find are email addresses in PDF files generated by Microsoft Office. Analysis revealed that while Apple's TextEdit preserves many strings ( Figure 5 ) in the PDF file, Microsoft Word does not ( Figure 6 ). Carrier has stated [10] that the only reliable way to extract text from PDFs is to render the page and process it with an optical character recognition program. Unfortunately, this approach is currently not possible with PDF fragments.
Base OS Installs
It is important to test forensic tools with base installations of operating systems. By characterizing the tool's behavior on base operating system installations we can gain insight as to how the tool will behave on actual data.
We used bulk extractor to analyze default installations of nine operating systems, including two versions of Linux and five versions of Windows.
The Linux systems had thousands of domains, email addresses, URLs, telephone numbers, and components of ZIP files. Inspection revealed that the domains and email addresses were largely those of Linux developers; the URLs were typically those of open source software update distribution points, web-based services used for software updates and XML schema; the telephone numbers were from software license agreements. For example, the most common phone number (found 47 times) in the Fedora release was (412) 268-4387, the number of the Carnegie Mellon University office of Technology Transfer. The most common false positive matches for telephone numbers came from arrays in PDF files, which sometimes were grouped as phone numbers. Adding a rule to discard any phone number preceded by a pair of 3 or 4 digit numbers or followed by the characters _/Subtype solved this problem.
The Windows operating systems were, comparatively speaking, quite clean. We did not see a large collection of email addresses on the Windows installations. We did, however, discover a significant number of "IP addresses" that were in fact version numbers and SNMP OIDs.
Prevalence of Compressed Email Addresses
To gauge the value of bulk extractor's data decompressing feature, we analyzed disks and USB storage devices, purchased on secondary markets around the world, for the presence of email addresses that could be recovered using GZIP or ZIP decompression and were not otherwise present on the disk.
The disk images, taken from the Real Data Corpus, [22] came mostly from China, India, Israel and Mexico. To gauge the age of each drive we analyzed the Date: headers in email messages found on the disks. (This information is extracted into bulk extractor's rfc822.txt feature file.) We took the date of the disks' last activity by averaging the last five timestamps that were present. We manually reviewed a sampling of the timestamps to assure ourselves that they did in fact correspond to actual times.
For each drive we listed the email addresses and noted whether each address was present in plaintext or in a compressed stream. We then tallied the number of email addresses that appeared on each drive and on no other drive in our corpus (the same elimination approach that we proposed in [20] ).
In total we analyzed 1473 drives. We found that 865 contained email addresses, of which 431 also contained timestamps. Table 5 tallies by year the number of drives recovered for that year, the total number of email addresses, the number of email addresses encoded with each compression format, and the number of email addresses only present on a single drive.
As can be seen, there are a significant number of email addresses that can only be recovered by opportunistically decompressing forensic data, demonstrating the importance of this technique.
Case Studies
This section discuss two cases in which bulk extractor provided timely information that proved critical to real-world investigations.
Credit Card Fraud
In the Spring of 2010 the San Luis Obispo, CA, County District Attorney's Office "filed charges of credit card fraud case and possession of materials to make fraudulent credit cards against two individuals." [33] The day before the suspects' preliminary hearing, an evidence technician at the SLO police department was given a 250GB hard drive that had been seized with the suspects. The technician was told to find evidence that tied the suspects to the alleged crime; the defense was expected to claim that the computer belonged to an unindicted associate, and that the suspects lacked the necessary skills to commit the crime.
An early version of bulk extractor was able to analyze the hard drive in roughly 2.5 hours. The email address and credit card number extractors, in combination with the histogram analysis, quickly established that:
• More than 10,000 credit card numbers were present on the hard drive.
• The most common email address clearly belonged to the primary defendant, disproving his contention that he had no connection to the drive and helping to establish the defendant's possession of the credit card numbers.
• The most common Internet search queries concerned credit card fraud and bank identification numbers-information that could be used to create fraudulent credit cards. This helping to establish the defendant's intent [33] . Based on the reports generated by bulk extractor and the testimony of the evidence technician, the court concluded that the District Attorney had met the burden of proof to hold the suspects pending trial.
It is unlikely that such high quality reporting could have been generated so quickly (and with so little effort on the part of the investigator) with a conventional forensic tool.
ATM Fraud
A 250GB disk drive was recovered from individuals suspected of setting a credit-card "skimmer" and pinhole camera at ATM machines in a major US city. Police needed to rapidly supply the banks with a list of the compromised credit card numbers so that the accounts could be shut down.
bulk extractor completed its processing after just two hours on a quad-core computer. The banks in question were provided with the ccns.txt output file, a list of credit-card numbers found on the drive. The banks were then able to immediately shut down the accounts before fraud could be committed. The actual files containing the data were later identified by using the file offsets present in the feature file.
As in the previous case, it is unlikely that today's commercial tools could have found the compromised credit card numbers in so short a time.
Limitations and Future Work
Bulk data analysis and bulk extractor are designed to complement conventional forensic tools, not to replace them. In this section we discuss specific limitations that we have encountered and the outlook for this technology.
Theoretical Limitations of Bulk Data Analysis
The primary limitation of bulk data analysis is that compressed objects fragmented across multiple locations are difficult to recover. Previous research has shown that this is not a significant limitation; with the exception of log files, most files forensically interesting are not fragmented [21] . And while log files are fragmented, most are not stored with compression, allowing the various fragments to be matched and recombined. In the rare cases that compressed objects are fragmented, Memon has shown that decompressing the compressed streams can be used as a tool for reassembly [44] .
Specific Design Limitations
Overall we have found bulk extractor's design to be quite powerful, as evidenced by the ease of adding new scanners and capabilities. Two limitations that have emerged, however, are the susceptibility to crashes caused from errors in C buffer processing, and the need to write individual scanners and decoders for each data type that we wish to recognize.
The issue of C buffer processing is not unique to bulk extractor-this issue impacts every tool that is not coded in a typesafe language such as C# or Java. Rewriting bulk extractor in such a language is complicated by the reliance on GNU flex and on libraries such as AFFLIB and libewf. We did create an earlier pure-Java version of bulk extractor using JFlex [29] instead of flex. At the time we found that compilation with JFlex required minutes rather than seconds, but that the resulting scanner ran approximately three times faster-presumably a result of Java's optimizing just-in-time compiler. We are considering a rewrite of bulk extractor into C# or Java.
Unicode and IDN issues
Unicode and Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) pose challenges for bulk data processing and extraction, as bulk data processing views data as a series of bytes but Unicode uses multiple bytes (and sometimes a variable number) for character encoding. An added complication is that ASCII and Unicode are not the only types of localized strings likely to be found. Data may be coded using a Windows Code Page. Disks from China or Japan may be coded in Big5, EUC-JP, GB18030, Shift-JIS, or other less popular coding schemes.
Fortunately, most email addresses and URLs encountered today are in simple ASCII, UTF-8 or UTF-16, all of which are handled by bulk extractor to a varying degree using a simple but reasonably accurate algorithm: bulk extractor contains regular expressions that recognize email addresses and URLs formed as 7-bit ASCII strings and as 8-bit strings where every other character is an ASCII NULL.
We are developing more sophisticated approach for text extraction. That approach is beyond the scope of this paper and will be discussed in a future publication.
SSDs and Other Random Access Media
The use of solid state drives (SSDs) and other forms of random access media is increasing. Modern SSDs are implemented using flash memory systems that support a limited number of writes to each cell. Media life is prolonged through the use of a flash translation layer (FTL) that maps the logical block addresses of the disk drive's interface to the physical pages that make up the storage system. Modern SSDs typically reserve 4-25% space beyond the rated storage capacity to support the FTL as well as previous versions of user data.
Recent experiments by Wei et al. [51] have shown that traditional file sanitization strategies of repeated overwrites do not work properly with SSDs. The authors demonstrated recovery by removing flash chips from a SSD and reading the data directly. The authors were not able to reconstruct the original file systems, however, as the operation of each drive's FTL is closely held proprietary corporate information.
Because it has the ability to recover useful investigative information without reconstructing individual files, in the future bulk data analysis may be an important tool in the analysis of SSDs.
Drive Profiling with Suppressed Terms
In §3.6 we presented our approach for suppressing commonly found features through the use of context-sensitive stop lists. Rather than being ignored, these features could be used for drive profiling, as their presence can be readily correlated with the installation and use of specific software.
Conclusion
This paper discusses a number of advances we have made in the field of bulk data analysis and presents the design and implementation of bulk extractor, a forensic tool that extracts identifiable features such as email addresses, Internet URLs, and EXIF structures from bulk data. Information extracted by bulk extractor is reported in feature files that indicate where each feature was found in the source file. bulk extractor also performs histogram analysis, reporting, for example, the most common email addresses and search terms present on a hard drive. The tool automatically decompresses compressed data that it encounters.
bulk extractor was developed as a research platform but has found use in some actual cases. Our users tell us that bulk extractor is extraordinarily useful. We hope that interest in the tool and in bulk data analysis will continue to grow.
Code Availability
We have made the bulk extractor source code, ancillary programs, and precompiled executables for Windows available on the http://afflib.org/ website. The code is public domain and may be freely incorporated into other open source or commercial applications.
The constructed drive can be downloaded from http://digitalcorpora.org.
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Email Addresses Found
Figure Captions Figure 1 . Two excerpts from a feature file generated by processing the NPS disk image ubnist1.gen3.E01 [22] . The first column is the byte offset within the file; the second column is the extracted email address; the third column is the email address in context (unprintable characters are represented as underbars). These email addresses are extracted from executables found within the Linux operating system and as a result do not constitute private information or human subject data.
Figure 2. These excerpts from bulk extractor's scan accts.flex input file for GNU flex [48] shows how multiple regular expressions are combined with external validators to extract credit card numbers, FedEx account numbers, and other types of information. Although these regular expressions must be manually created, tuned and maintained, they offer high speed and an astonishingly low false positive rate. Notice that the email address is preserved in the output. Figure 6 . An inflated stream from a PDF file created using Microsoft Word 2008 for Macintosh. The original document contained the string "This is a testuser doc pdf@microsoftword.com Really." Notice that the email address is split into three pieces. Figure 1 : Two excerpts from a feature file generated by processing the NPS disk image ubnist1.gen3.E01 [22] . The first column is the byte offset within the file; the second column is the extracted email address; the third column is the email address in context (unprintable characters are represented as underbars). These email addresses are extracted from executables found within the Linux operating system and as a result do not constitute private information or human subject data. [48] shows how multiple regular expressions are combined with external validators to extract credit card numbers, FedEx account numbers, and other types of information. Although these regular expressions must be manually created, tuned and maintained, they offer high speed and an astonishingly low false positive rate. 
